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Mike Ioane vs the Arrests . We found this interesting reading on findlaw.com. I think Michael Ioane is right and obviously has done his homework.

Arrests and Other Detentions .–That the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect against arbitrary arrests as well as against unreasonable searches was early assumed by Chief Justice Marshall 55 and is now established law. 56 At the common law, it was proper to arrest one who had committed a breach of the peace or a felony without a warrant, 57 and this history is reflected in the fact that the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the arrest is made in a public place on probable cause, regardless of whether a warrant has been obtained. 58 However, in order to effectuate an arrest in the home, absent consent or exigent circumstances, police officers must have a warrant. 59 The Fourth Amendment applies to ”seizures” and it is not necessary that a detention be a formal arrest in order to bring to bear the requirements of warrants or probable cause in instances in which warrants may be forgone. 60 Some objective justification must be shown to validate all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of arrest, although the nature of the detention will determine whether probable cause or some reasonable and articulable suspicion is necessary. 61

Until relatively recently, the legality of arrests was seldom litigated in the Supreme Court because of the rule that a person detained pursuant to an arbitrary seizure–unlike evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search–remains subject to custody and presentation to court. 62 But the application of self-incrimination and other exclusionary rules to the States and the heightening of their scope in state and federal cases alike brought forth the rule that verbal evidence, confessions, and other admissions, like all derivative evidence obtained as a result of unlawful seizures, could be excluded. 63 Thus, a confession made by one illegally in custody must be suppressed, unless the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession had become so attenuated that the latter should not be deemed ”tainted” by the former. 64 Similarly, fingerprints and other physical evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest must be suppressed. 65

Searches and Inspections in Noncriminal Cases .–Certain early cases held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable only when a search was undertaken for criminal investigatory purposes, 66 and the Supreme Court until recently employed a reasonableness test for such searches without requiring either a warrant or probable cause in the absence of a warrant. 67 But in 1967, the Court held in two cases that administrative inspections to detect building code violations must be undertaken pursuant to warrant if the occupant objects. 68 ”We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime. . . . But we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely ‘peripheral.’ It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.” 69 Certain administrative inspections utilized to enforce regulatory schemes with regard to such items as alcohol and firearms are, however, exempt from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and may be authorized simply by statute. 70 Camara and See were reaffirmed in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 71 in which the Court held violative of the Fourth Amendment a provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act which authorized federal inspectors to search the work area of any employment facility covered by the Act for safety hazards and violations of regulations, without a warrant or other legal process. The liquor and firearms exceptions were distinguished on the basis that those industries had a long tradition of close government supervision, so that a person in those businesses gave up his privacy expectations. But OSHA was a relatively recent statute and it regulated practically every business in or affecting interstate commerce; it was not open to a legislature to extend regulation and then follow it with warrantless inspections. Additionally, OSHA inspectors had unbounded discretion in choosing which businesses to inspect and when to do so, leaving businesses at the mercy of possibly arbitrary actions and certainly with no assurances as to limitation on scope and standards of inspections. Further, warrantless inspections were not necessary to serve an important governmental interest, inasmuch as most businesses would consent to inspection and it was not inconvenient to require OSHA to resort to an administrative warrant in order to inspect sites where consent was refused. 72

In Donovan v. Dewey, 73 however, Barlow’s was substantially limited and a new standard emerged permitting extensive governmental inspection of commercial property, 74 absent warrants. Under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, governing underground and surface mines (including stone quarries), federal officers are directed to inspect underground mines at least four times a year and surface mines at least twice a year, pursuant to extensive regulations as to standards of safety. The statute specifically provides for absence of advanced notice and requires the Secretary of Labor to institute court actions for injunctive and other relief in cases in which inspectors are denied admission. Sustaining the statute, the Court proclaimed that government had a ”greater latitude” to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property than of homes, because of ”the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual’s home, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections.” 75
Dewey was distinguished from Barlow’s in several ways. First, Dewey involved a single industry, unlike the broad coverage in Barlow’s. Second, the OSHA statute gave minimal direction to inspectors as to time, scope, and frequency of inspections, while FMSHA specified a regular number of inspections pursuant to standards. Third, deference was due Congress’ determination that unannounced inspections were necessary if the safety laws were to be effectively enforced. Fourth, FMSHA provided businesses the opportunity to contest the search by resisting in the civil proceeding the Secretary had to bring if consent was denied. 76 The standard of a long tradition of government supervision permitting warrantless inspections was dispensed with, because it would lead to ”absurd results,” in that new and emerging industries posing great hazards would escape regulation. 77 Dewey suggests, therefore, that warrantless inspections of commercial establishments are permissible so long as the legislature carefully drafts its statute.
Dewey was applied in New York v. Burger 78 to inspection of automobile junkyards and vehicle dismantling operations, a situation where there is considerable overlap between administrative and penal objectives. Applying the Dewey three-part test, the Court concluded that New York has a substantial interest in stemming the tide of automobile thefts, that regulation of vehicle dismantling reasonably serves that interest, and that statutory safeguards provided adequate substitute for a warrant requirement. The Court rejected the suggestion that the warrantless inspection provisions were designed as an expedient means of enforcing the penal laws, and instead saw narrower, valid regulatory purposes to be served: e.g., establishing a system for tracking stolen automobiles and parts, and enhancing the ability of legitimate businesses to compete. ”[A] State can address a major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions,” the Court declared; in such circumstances warrantless administrative searches are permissible in spite of the fact that evidence of criminal activity may well be uncovered in the process. 79

In other contexts, the Court has also elaborated the constitutional requirements affecting administrative inspections and searches. Thus, in Michigan v. Tyler, 80 it subdivided the process by which an investigation of the cause of a fire may be conducted. Entry to fight the fire is, of course, an exception based on exigent circumstances, and no warrant or consent is needed; firemen on the scene may seize evidence relating to the cause under the plain view doctrine. Additional entries to investigate the cause of the fire must be made pursuant to warrant procedures governing administrative searches. Evidence of arson discovered in the course of such an administrative inspection is admissible at trial, but if the investigator finds probable cause to believe that arson has occurred and requires further access to gather evidence for a possible prosecution, he must obtain a criminal search warrant. 81
One curious case has approved a system of ”home visits” by welfare caseworkers, in which the recipients are required to admit the worker or lose eligibility for benefits. 82 In another unusual case, the Court held that asheriff’s assistance to a trailer park owner in disconnecting and removing a mobile home constituted a ”seizure” of the home. Supp.1

In addition, there are now a number of situations, some of them analogous to administrative searches, where ”’special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement . . . justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements.” 83 In one of these cases the Court, without acknowledging the magnitude of the leap from one context to another, has taken the Dewey/Burger rationale–developed to justify warrantless searches of business establishments–and applied it to justify the significant intrusion into personal privacy represented by urinalysis drug testing. Because of the history of pervasive regulation of the railroad industry, the Court reasoned, railroad employees have a diminished expectation of privacy that makes mandatory urinalysis less intrusive and more reasonable. 84

With respect to automobiles, the holdings are mixed. Random stops of automobiles to check drivers’ licenses, vehicle registrations, and safety conditions were condemned as too intrusive; the degree to which random stops would advance the legitimate governmental interests involved did not outweigh the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy. 85 On the other hand, in South Dakota v. Opperman, 86 the Court sustained the admission of evidence found when police impounded an automobile from a public street for multiple parking violations and entered the car to secure and inventory valuables for safekeeping. Marijuana was discovered in the glove compartment.

The more that I do research on Michael Ioane’s case I find my self troubled. If they can take his rights away illegally – What would they do to any of us little people. I would love to get anyone opinion on Michael Ioane’s case.

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